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LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Lee Hargrave*

EXAMINE RECORDS

- PROPERTY

TRANSFERS

Though the right to "examine public documents" may be limited
"in cases established by law,"' its establishment as an important constitutional value 2 continues to be the basis for construing the right
liberally. Tradition also supports generous public access to public records,
especially conveyance and mortgage records, which are crucial to the
state's scheme for protecting ownership and other real rights in immovable property. 3 Current statutes recognize a right to examine such
documents with "all reasonable comfort and facility for the full exercise
of the right," but subject to the custodian's power to maintain "such
vigiliance as is required to prevent alteration of any record while it is
being examined." 4
In Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, s the supreme court probed the
restrictions that could be placed on access to conveyance records and
decided in favor of access. In the case, a title company sought to
microfilm every recorded document in the mortgage and conveyance
records before the records were bound. The district court denied the
requested mandamus on the grounds that the statute contemplated neither.
a right to copy all documents nor a benefit to those who copied the
records as part of a profit making venture. The statute, however, makes
no such exceptions, and the supreme court read it literally as extending
the right to copying all records and as not excluding access solely because
the copying was a commercial venture. The supreme court also rejected
the court of appeal finding that an adequate basis existed to limit
plaintiff's right to copy the records because its microfilm copying ma-
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chine had crumpled one document and because of allegations that documents were returned out of order. 6 Citing Louisiana Revised Statutes
(La. R.S.) 44:35(B), which places the burden of justification of a denied
request on the custodian, a unanimous supreme court reversed and found
that the facts did not support denial of the request: "This single occurrence of alteration does not give to the custodian the power to prevent
Mr. Heeter from ever reproducing the records again. Finding the records
out of order is not such an 'alteration' as'7 justifies excluding a member
of the public from exercising his rights."
The opinion is significant in construing La. R.S. 44:31 to give the
citizen/examiner several means of accessing the public records-simple
inspection, copying the records, reproducing the records, or obtaining
from the custodian a reproduction of the record. Arguably, the clerk
could have complied with the staute by providing paper copies of the
documents for ten cents per page. The court concluded, however, that
the clerk must "allow the reproduction of those records by any safe
means during normal business hours in a non-discriminatory manner,
and free of charge." ' Justice Blanche's concurrence emphasizes that the
decision was based on the factual record in the case and that the right
of the examiner "may not be gained at the inconvenience of the public
No doubt, room
or the orderly operation of the clerk's office." 9
exists for case by case development of the type of regulations that will
be considered reasonable in light of possible harm to the records. One
is reminded of the scene in the film Chinatown,10 where a page from
a bound volume of recorded property transfers was sureptitiously removed with a measuring stick. Still, the instant case seems to strike a
balance in favor of public access and clearly puts the burden on the
public agency to support a denial of that access. Such an approach is
consistent with the policy behind the constitutional provision.
PUBLIC RECORDS -

THE WORLD'S FAIR

In Lewis v. Spurney," the court of appeal upheld the right of a
reporter to have access to financial records of the private, non-profit
corporation organized to conduct the Louisiana World Exposition. The
right extended to financial records beginning from the time the corporation first received state funds.
The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the corporation
was a public body and relied instead on the definition of public records

6.
7.
8.
9.

433 So. 2d 1105 (La. App. IstCir. 1983).
450 So. 2d at 938.
Id.
Id.

10. Chinatown [Motion Picture] (Los Angeles: Paramount, 1974).
i1. 456 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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in La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2). The definition there is quite broad, conceivably
applying to any record whatsoever relating to money "received or paid
by or under the authority of the constitution or laws of this state."
However, if a document is a public record, any citizen of the age of
majority has a right to examine it from the "custodian," 2 who is
defined to be "the public official or head of any public body having
custody .. .'"I
". The implication of that language
is that only public
records of public bodies are available. Under any other interpretation
the court's approach will give access to the financial records of any
person or corporation who receives any state money - including the
financial records of state employees, state contractors, and recipients of
4

state subsidies.1

The result in Lewis is reasonable nonetheless, since the corporation
involved was a public body subject to the act, or as phrased in the
statute, "a public or quasi-public nonprofit corporation designated as
an entity to perform a governmental or proprietary function. ' "'5 The
analysis here is similar to the United States Supreme Court multi-factor
approach used in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 6 to analyze
state ,action for fourteenth amendment purposes. The approach examines
the extent to which governmental power, governmental encouragement,
governmental workers, and general governmental authority have been
loaned to or associated with a private entity. In Lewis, the close relationship between the Louisiana World Exposition and a state agency
organized to construct an exhibit at the fair, the infusion of state funds,
and the support of state officials as the fair approached bankruptcy
should support the finding that the organization was a public body.
This approach is essentially that taken in cases dealing with the right
to attend public meetings. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Spain v.
LouisianaHigh School Athletic Association7 found that the association's
function of regulating high school athletic contests participated in by
public schools and the fact that its membership was composed largely
of public schools created a nexus sufficient to make it a public entity
for public meetings purposes. Similarly, that same association's actions
8
have long been found to be state action for equal protection purposes.1

12. La. R.S. 44:31-32 (1982).
13. La. R.S. 44:1(A)(3) (1982).
14. See also the dictum in Carter v. Finch, 322 So. 2d 305, 307 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1975), suggesting that the ultimate recipients of state funds are subject to the act "whether
they be governmental, public, or private bodies."
15. La. R.S. 44:1(A)(1) (1982).
16. 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961).
17. 398 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1981).
18. Id. at 1390, n.4:

LHSAA has been recognized as a private unincorporated, voluntary association

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

In Seghers v. Community Advancement, Inc., 19 the same approach was

taken to reach the conclusion that an antipoverty agency that dispensed
federal and state funds as part of the governmentally-encouraged war
on poverty was subject to the open meetings law.
ACCESS TO DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERED DOCUMENTS-PRIVACY

Whether a litigant may release to the public materials supplied to
him during discovery or whether a citizen/newspaper has a right to see
such documents is largely a statutory question. Louisiana's statute is
similar to the federal rule in providing for protective orders to prevent
the dissemination of such material "for good cause" in order "to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue
burden or expense." 20
Application of the statute produced a divided supreme court in
Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. Delta Development Co. 2
The court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated a lower court
order which allowed public access to discovered financial records disclosing the proceeds from royalties under mineral leases of public lands.
The holding may be limited since the 3-3 vote of regular members on
the court22 was broken by a judge ad hoc who concurred on narrow
grounds, emphasizing deference to the lower court judge's discretion in
the matter. The holding may also be limited since plaintiffs had not
produced evidence of embarrassment or oppression. However, the case
is worth noting here for the extent to which the plurality opinion discusses
free press values and for its suggestion of a strong privacy interest in

in the following cases, Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association,
323 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975); Marino v. Waters, 220 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1969); Sanders v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 242 So. 2d
19 (La. App., 3rd Cir. 1970); David v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 244 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Watkins v. Louisiana High
School Athletic Association, 301 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1975); and
Walsh v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. den. [449] U.S. [1124], 101 S.Ct. 939, 67 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1981).
We note, however, that the actions of the organization have been deemed
"state action" for purposes of compliance with the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Dumez v. La. High School Athletic Association,
supra; Walsh v. Louisiana High School' Athletic Association, supra; Louisiana
High School Athletic Association v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1968).

19.
20.
21.
22.
Appeal

357 So. 2d 626
Fed. R. Civ. P.
472 So. 2d 560
Justice Watson
served as justice

(La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
30(d); La. Code Civ. P. art. 1426.
(La. 1985).
recused himself. Judge Shortess of the First Circuit Court of
ad hoc.
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such records of persons who are not unique public figures as were the
23
family of Judge Leander Perez.
The court in Plaquemines Parish affirmed the lower court order
that allowed public access to the lease payments that went to public
officials-former judge and district attorney Leander Perez, former district attorney Leander Perez, Jr. and former Commission Council chairman Chalin Perez, and their families. 24 Thus, funds received by the
daughters of the judge were to be public; the only parties whose receipts
would not be released. were the children of the judge's daughters. In
effect, there was almost total disclosure. The constitutional right to
"observe the deliberations of public bodies" established in article 12,
section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution does not by its terms include
attendance at a civil or criminal trial. A judge is hardly a "body" and
by tradition jury deliberations have not been "public." Public trial in
criminal cases provided for in article 1, section 1625 of the 1974 constitution is essentially a right of the accused. The interest in public
scrutiny serves primarily to ensure fairness and procedural regularity to
the defendant and secondarily to ensure proper conduct by court officials
and other government officials in the judicial process.2 6 The constitution
provides no right of the public to attend civil trials. The language of
article 1, section 22 that all courts "shall be open" is used in the sense
of courts being available to litigants rather than being directed to issue
of public access. While there may be a first amendment right to report

23. See Glen Jeansonne, LEANDER PEREZ, BOSS OF THE DELTA (Baton Rouge:
LSU Press (1977)); James Conaway, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LEANDER PEREZ
(New York: Knopf 1973); Richard A. Smith, Oil, Brimstone and Judge Perez, 57 FORTUNE 143-59 (1958); Lester Velie, Kingfish of the Dixiecrats, 124 COLLIER'S 9-13 (12/
17/49) and 21-44 (12/24/49). 472 So. 2d at 565, n.5.
24. Suit was filed against the children of Leander Perez, Sr., their spouses and exspouses, and their children.
25. "Every person charged with crime ... is entitled to a speedy, public, and impartial
trial ......
26.
We start with the proposition that it is a "public trial" that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees to the "accused." The purpose of the requirement of
a public trial was to guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with and
not unjustly condemned. History has proven that secret tribunals were effective
instruments of oppression. As our Brother Black so well said in In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499 (1948): "The traditional Anglo-American distrust
for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice
by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber,
and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet.... Whatever other
benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trials be conducted in public may
confer upon our society the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. At
268-270, 68 S.Ct. at 505-506. (Footnotes omitted.).
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1631 (1965).
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what has occurred at a public trial, including printing the name of a
rape victim contained in an indictment presented at a trial, 27 there is
no right to attend discovery proceedings or to have access to materials
supplied by litigants during discovery.28 The need for public scrutiny of
court officials to ensure justice and procedural regularity is satisfied by
scrutiny of the trial itself; that interest does not require access to
discovered material, much of which may not be admitted at trial because
29
it is irrelevant.
The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Dixon is interesting in that
it is not based on the public interest in access to assure the regularity
and integrity of the trial process. Rather, it is based on the public
interest in material that may relate to allegations of corruption by public
officials. That concern presumably is relevant in this kind of semipolitical lawsuit by a public body seeking money from former public
officials.30 The case suggests that in ordinary litigation, without this
kind of public law aspect, the public interest in the details of the private
law suit would be much less.
The risk of the prevailing approach is that it could encourage
frivilous suits against public officials simply for the purpose of forcing
disclosure of information to be obtained through discovery, i.e. use of
the lawsuit as a substitute freedom of information act when the act
does not provide for disclosure of the desired information.3 Ironically,
in the instant case, the lower court judge, after providing for the
disclosure of the information, denied recovery by the Commission Council on the ground that the action was barred by prescription. The net
result was that public disclosure was the only relief granted to the
plaintiffs in the lower court.
Another possible approach is disclosure as a substitute for criminal
proceedings when allegations of public corruption are made. Information
provided to a grand jury to support an indictment would not be available
to the public. No criminal discovery of the defendant's records would
be allowed. Only information introduced at trial would be part of the
record which would be available to the public. It is perhaps ironic that
the statutes dealing with pre-trial procedure thus become the vehicle for
disclosing information that is not otherwise required to be disclosed by
the constitution or by other statutes, where presumably such basic policy
issues would be handled.

27. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029 (1975).
28. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). See Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
29. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1,
37 (1983).

30.
31.

Marcus, supra note 29, at 50; see In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Marcus, supra note 29, at 53.
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In this area, another constitutional value comes into play: the interest
in privacy that is sacrificed by the publication of the discovered material.
A first amendment-based federal right protects against forced disclosure
of information related to one's associations-NAACP v. Alabama protected the plaintiff from disclosing its membership;3 2 Seattle Times Co.
v. Rhinehart33 protected the lists and contributions of supporters of an
unorthodox religious group. While those cases may not apply when, as
here, the concern is money from leases of public lands,3 4 there exists a
state constitutional guarantee that was designed to expand the protection
of privacy. Article 1, section 5 protects not only against unreasonable
seizures or searches, but also against "unreasonable . . . invasions of
privacy."
The plurality opinion in Plaquemines Parish reasoned that section
5 did not apply to the public officials involved because of the strong
public interest in their activities, and also because much of the information that would be produced had already been made public in earlier
books and articles, albeit not as specific as the discovery materials would
provide.
The implication of the case is that as to non-public officials and
non-public figures, the constitutional provision would be applied and
would be used to protect against disclosure. Since the state has a virtual
monopoly on dispute resolution, it could hardly condition the granting
of a remedy to a plaintiff on his waiving this right to privacy. The
position of a defendant in a civil case, who is being forced to litigate
the issue or suffer a default judgment would be stronger. Even more
worthy of protection would be the non-party witness in a civil suit who
is being compelled to testify. Those privacy interests should be weighed
quite heavily in the balance.
PUBLIC MEETINGS

That public meeting laws are difficult to enforce was demonstrated
in Delta Development Co., Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Commission
Council." Delta sought to enjoin prosecution of the council's lawsuit
against it on the grounds that the council's authorization to sue was
adopted in violation of the open meetings law. The court of appeal
denied the injunction since, once the issue was raised, the council held
another meeting in clear compliance with the law, and "ratified" (readopted would perhaps be a better term) the action that had been taken
earlier.

32.

357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163 (1958).

33. 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
34. 472 So. 2d at 561.
35.

451 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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La. R.S. 42:9 makes action taken in violation of the open meetings
rules "voidable," a term which suggests that courts have discretion in
deciding whether to cancel an enactment. Otherwise, the simple statement
that such actions are "void" would have been used. Since nothing
prohibits a public body from readopting an ordinance that would be
invalidated by such a court decision, there would seem to be little point
for a court to do so when, as in this case, the governing body had
already reassembled and readopted the legislation following proper procedures. There was little support for the plaintiff's argument that such
an act would be an absolute nullity, for that result would be inconsistent
with the 60 day limitation period within which the action to annul must
be taken. The assumption had to be that the invalidity was relative,
and that the action has effect until contested.
The voidability approach has not been a successful means of enforcing of public meetings laws. 36 Criminal prosecutions are few considering other demands on the time of prosecutors and the political
sensitivity of such actions. A traditional tort suit seems difficult because
damages are hard to prove. A solution suggested in this review still
merits adoption-a statute providing a private cause of action with
stipulated monetary damages. Such a suit would not depend on public
officials for enforcement and could well be a sufficient incentive to
make public officials comply."
EQUAL PROTECTION - SEX DISCRIMINATION

During the last decade, the decline in this state of governmentimposed discrimination based on sex has been significant. The primary
forces behind the changes have been federal court decisions and responsive state legislative action; the Louisiana Supreme Court continues
to be reluctant to exercise substantial scrutiny in sex discrimination cases.
A review of a decade's cases disclosed a trend continued by State v.
Corky,38 which found no constitutional defect in a statute forbidding
liquor licensees from hiring "B-girls" but which did not penalize the
hiring of men who solicit drinks from patrons.39
Alimony. The state supreme court upheld alimony pendente lite for
wives, but not for husbands, in 1976,40 and permanent alimony for
wives, but not husbands, in 1978. 4 After the 1979 United States Supreme

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Comment, supra note 1, at 218.
Id.
458 So. 2d 904 (La. 1984).
La. R.S. 26:285(8) (1975).
Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
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Court decision in Orr v. Orr,42 the Louisiana courts followed suit.4 3
About the same time, the Louisiana legislature amended the alimony
statutes to be gender-neutral."
Community Property Management. While the flurry of legislative

action to change the community system was underway, ' 5 the supreme
court refused to declare the existing regime unconstitutional. 46 The United

States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal and the United States Supreme
Court decided otherwise in Kirchberg v. Feenstra.47 Meanwhile, the
legislature had adopted Act 627 of 1978 and Act 709 of 1979 to end

the discrimination.
Jury Service. Louisiana courts upheld the state's jury selection proc-

ess by which women were considered for service only if they filed a
notice indicating their desire to serve.4 1 Ultimately, the United States
Supreme Court found the scheme unconstitutional under the sixth amendment. 49 Meanwhile, the Constitutional Convention of 1973 abolished the
old system and established a gender-neutral procedure for jury selection. 0
Non-Support. Statutes5 ' making it a crime for a husband to fail to

support his wife, but not making the wife similarly responsible

2

were

upheld. Legislation was adopted 4 years later to make the obligation
53
gender-neutral.
Prostitution.The court approved the law which confined the offense

to conduct by females engaging in indiscriminate sex with males for

compensation.5 4 The crime was changed by statute to be gender-neutral. 5
Domicile. In an exception, the court in the 1978 case of Craig v.
Craig,5 6 held statutory provisions that a woman could have no domicile
other than that of her husband to be unconstitutional. The legislature

42. 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
43. See the Louisiana cases following Orr, begining with Hingle v. Hingle, 369 So.
2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) and including Loyacano v. Loyacano, 375 So. 2d 1314
(La. 1970) on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court.
44. 1979 La. Acts No. 72, amending La. Civ. Code arts. 148 and
160.
45. Spaht, Background of Matrimonial Regimes Revision, 39 La. L. Rev. 323 (1979).
46. Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin, 358 So. 2d 295 (La. 1978).
47. 609 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1979); 450 U.S. 455, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981).
48. State v. Ivy, 307 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975).
49. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975).
50. La. Const. art. V, § 33, replacing La. Const. of 1921, art. 7, § 41.
51. La. R.S. 14:74(1) (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts No. 614).
52. State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975). But see State v. Fuller, 377 So. 2d
335 (La. 1979) overrulling Barton. Hargrave, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 36 La. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1976).
53. 1979 La. Acts No. 614 (now appearing as La. R.S. 14:74(A) (1)(a) (Supp. 1985)).
54. State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909 (La. 1974).
55. 1977 La. Acts. No. 49 (now appearing as La. R.S. 14:82(a) and (b) (Supp. 1985)).
56. Craig v. Craig, 365 So. 2d 1298 (La. 1978).
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repealed this provision in 1985.1 7 Additionally, although a wife was
bound to live with and reside with her husband,5" the court of appeals
ruled in Crosby v. Crosby59 that this provision could not be used to
define an abandonment of the husband by his non-accompanying wife
for purposes of fault in separation or divorce proceedings.. The legislature
also repealed this statute in 1985.6
Most of the Louisiana Supreme Court cases involved in these developments have not pursued an intensive analysis of the possible rational
bases for the legislative classifications. The cases seem to be proceeding
without much inquiry on the part of the parties as to the actual or
conjectural purposes of the legislature in making the classifications. The
opinions place more emphasis on a presumption of constitutionality and
determining that a low level of scrutiny will apply to such discrimination.
This approach is questionable in light of the United States Supreme
Court's approach in dealing with sex discrimination cases. It is also
inconsistent with the state's policy as reflected by legislation and the
equal protection guarantee adopted in the 1974 Constitution.
State v. Corky is typical of this approach. Typically, also, in response
to the decision in Corky, the legislature adopted Act 412 of 1985 to
make the applicable liquor regulations gender-neutral; they now prohibit
the employment of "persons" to engage in the forbidden activities.
The current federal trend seems to be to continue with an inter6
mediate level of scrutiny in gender discrimination cases. Craig v. Boren '
continues to be cited in this regard; Heckler v. Matthews62 and Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan63 referred to the need for an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the discrimination. Certainly, Michael
M. v. Superior CourtM was significant in upholding a gender-based
classification. The Supreme Court found that the dangers of pregnancy
supported a scheme that made sexual conduct with minor females a
more serious crime that sexual conduct with minor males. However, it
does not seem to have reversed the trend. The following term, in
Mississippi State University for Women, 65 the Court held it unconstitutional for a state university to deny males admission to a nursing
program.
A realistic appraisal of the closely decided state supreme court cases
dealing with the constitutionality of the community property regime and

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

1985 La. Acts No. 272 (amending La. Civ. Code art. 39).
La. Civ. Code art. 120.
434 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
1985 La. Acts No. 271 (repealing La. Civ. Code art. 120).
429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984).
458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982).
450 U.S. 464, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
458 U.S. 718, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
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the difficulties which, it was found, would result from holding the system
unconstitutional, especially when legislative committees were at work to
change the system, may explain the reluctance of the court to be more
active in this area. 66 But once the decisions were made, they became
precedent and were relied upon by later courts in situations far removed
from the practical difficulties of those first decisions. One would expect
that later courts would give little deference to these precedents because
of the peculiar facts involved.
EQUAL PROTECTION - MENTAL CONDITION

In contrast to its gender discrimination cases, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has been more likely to intervene in cases dealing with discrimination against the mentally handicapped. In Clark v. Manuel,67 the
court, after substantial discussion, decided that a middle level of scrutiny,
as opposed to the more lenient rational basis test, should be applied in
classifications that affect the mentally handicapped. Applying that test,
the court invalidated legislation that conditioned location of group homes
for the mentally handicapped on approval of the local governing authority, while not subjecting other uses of property to such approval.
The court's discussion, relying primarily on federal constitutional
decisions rather than on state constitutional grounds, echoed the approach of the fifth circuit in Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of
Cleburne, Texas. 6 Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the result in Cleburne which disallowed the local approval requirement, but in an obtuse affirmation the court stated that the middle
level scrutiny applied by the fifth circuit would not be applied. 69 Instead,
the court ostensibly required only minimal scrutiny and then found that
the governmental action did not meet that standard.
If one focuses on the articulated level of scrutiny, one finds the
United States Supreme Court applying a higher level of scrutiny in sex
discrimination cases than in mental retardation cases. The Louisiana
Supreme Court adopts the reverse view, applying higher scrutiny in
discrimination against the mentally handicapped than in discrimination
cases based on sex.

66. Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin, 358 So. 2d 295 (La. 1978).
67. 463 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1985). Clark also is significant in its finding that building
and use restrictions confining lots to residential use were not violated by group homes
since such use was residential. See Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984Louisiana Constitutional Law, 45 La. L. Rev. 397, 409 (1984).
68. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1984). The Louisiana court stated, "the logic of the decision in Cleburne is compelling."
463 So. 2d at 1285.

69.

53 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S. July 1, 1985) (No. 84-468).
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Even if one recognizes that the ostensibly quantifiable levels of
scrutiny are approximate at best and that a realistic approach to these
cases hinges on result rather than rhetoric, the state supreme court is
still consistent with the federal court in mental retardation matters, but
it is less likely to intervene than the federal court in sex discrimination
cases.
.Though the Louisiana Supreme Court does not discuss in detail the
state constitution, that document does provide some guidance. The equal
protection clause, prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped and
sex-based discrimination in the same terms was added in 1974: "No law
shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a
person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political
ideas or affiliations. ' ' 70 The implication of the clause is that under the
state constitution sex-based discrimination and discrimination against the
handicapped ought to be scrutinized on the same level. 71 Whatever the
ostensible level of scrutiny, the emphasis must be on the possible rational
bases (or actual bases, if the record is available) for differing treatment
of the mentally handicapped. O'Connor v. Donaldson" suggests that
protecting "normal" or "sensitive" persons from exposure to the retarded is not a justifiable basis for government action, but that protecting
the general populace from dangerous mentally 'retarded persons would
be a valid interest. That same case, on a lesser level of certitude, would
be the basis for questioning whether danger to self is an adequate basis
for disparate treatment of the mentally handicapped. 73 While a state's
fiscal interest in controlling the costs of treatment for handicapped
indigents may play some role in justifying institutionalization, the instant
case did not involve legislation that was so motivated.
Although the factual records in the cases are thin in regard to
proving that the legislation was responsive to prospective neighbors who
feared that group homes would lessen property values or pose a safety
threat, both the state and the federal court decisions must be taken as
giving little weight to those undifferentiated fears absent some greater
74
evidence of danger to person and property.

70.

La. Const. art. I, § 3 (Right to Individual Dignity):
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
71. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1974).
72. 422 U.S. 563, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
73. 422 U.S. at 573-75, 95 S. Ct. at 2492-94.
74. 53 U.S.L.W. at 5026.
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EQUAL PROTECTION - DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE MARRIED AND THE
UNMARRIED

Louisiana's community property laws provide that in the absence
of a contract to the contrary, spouses share equally in one another's
acquisitions by onerous transactions during marriage.75 It is further
presumed that property of the spouses is community property.7 6 It ap77
pears that unmarried persons cannot contract to establish a community,
and those who purport to be co-owners of property do not benefit from
a similiar community presumption. If the title to property is in the name
of two persons, it is usually presumed that they are equal owners.78
However, if they are engaged in the kind of continuing relationship one
calls "concubinage", it is also necessary to show that one made a
contribution to the acquisition of something "obtained independent of
the concubinage." 7 9 Brown v. Browns° reaffirms this view. Although the
statutes are not clear in establishing a basis for this rule, it appears
well settled and probably stems from a public policy against the payment
of money for sexual services. 8 ' Indeed, if there is such harm in payment
for sex, it would appear logical to apply the same rule of public policy
to persons who cohabit with others of the same sex for pay.
It seems that most courts are maintaining differing treatments of
married and unmarried persons in light of equal protection attacks. Even
though the standard of scrutiny of the differing treatments of illegitimate
as opposed to legitimate children has risen to a high level, based in
part on the view that it is unfair to punish the children for the "sins"
of their parents, that same high standard has not been applied to the
parents, or more generally, to persons who cohabit without marriage.82
It is permissible to establish advantages to those who do marry. Or,
as it is often put, encouragement of marriage and discouragement of

75. La. Civ. Code arts. 2325 to 2376.
76. La. Civ. Code art. 2340.
77. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
78. The law applicable to the situation where a concubine is listed as a co-vendee
is that "[ilf the concubine can furnish strict and conclusive proof that her capital and
industry, obtained independent of the concubinage, contributed a full share to the acquisition of the subject property, then equity dictates she be declared a one-half owner."
Brown v. Brown, 459 So. 2d 560, 563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). There is a rebuttable
presumption that any contribution made by the concubine was with funds obtained
independent of the concubinage.
79. Brown v. Brown, 459 So. 2d 560, 563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Broadway v.
Broadway, 417 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982)).
80. 459 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
81. La. R.S. 14:82 thru 14:86 (1974 and Supp. 1985) (prostitution and related offenses).
82. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968) (wrongful death); See also
La. Const. art. I, § 3. "No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth ......
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sex outside of marriage is "in the interest of good morals, public order
and the preservation of society." 3 The extent to which the state actually
encourages marriage is questionable. The state has made divorce easy
to obtain, resulting in the kind of instability through successive marriages
that the institution of marriage was arguably designed to prevent. Also
problematical is the extent to which the notion of "good morals,"
presumably abstention from sex outside of marriage, can be fostered
absent a connection, at least historically, with a religious doctrine. Absent
such an independent foundation, it poses problems with the establishment
of religion. However, if the United States Supreme Court can dissociate
God and Christ from a creche scene and find a non-religious aspect of
Christmas, these problems should present little difficulty. 4
An attempt to further elaborate on the interests of "public order"
and the "preservation of society" in secular terms has not been made
in the decisions. One might turn to the statistics on juvenile delinquency
and child behavior, which suggest that the children of married couples
are less likely to commit crimes and otherwise harm others, to justify
the state's support of stable relationships."' Even here, the state would
have to provide a rationale for permitting unstable marriages-i.e., easy
divorce and easy remarriage-while penalizing stable non-marital relationships.

83. K. Lorio, Concubinage and its Alternatives: A Proposal for a More Perfect
Union, 26 Loy. L. Rev. I (1980) (esp. p. 18); Justice Harlan probably best stated the
argument in his dissent in Poe v. UlIman:
The very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates
that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the
community, but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of
its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that
which is purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community
concern a range of subjects with which every society in civilized times has found
it necessary to deal. The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the
sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children
are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and
homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining
sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance
of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon
that basis.
367 U.S. 497, 545, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 1778 (1961).
84. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
85. This proposition is open to debate. In an early study, the Gluecks found that

60 percent of a sample of delinquents came from broken homes and only 34% of
nondelinquents came from such homes. S. & E. Glueck, Delinquents in the Making
(Harper & Row, 1952); S.& E. Glueck, Family Environment and Delinquency (Houghton
Mifflin, 1962). But those figures "may demonstrate nothing more than an assumption by
the court that juveniles from broken homes are more likely to require institutionalization
than those from unbroken homes." W. Sanders, Juvenile Delinquency 27 (New York,
Preager, 1971). See also Delinquency Prevention: Theories and Strategies (U.S. Dept. of
Justice 1979).
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The bottom line is hard to quantify. The result will hinge in large
part on the level of justification which the courts will require to sustain
the differing treatments. So far, the courts have generally required only
a minimal rational basis, and the recent decisions concerning property
claims seem to follow this minimal requirement. Nevertheless, when a
fundamental interest has been effected, a higher level of equal protection
scrutiny has been applied. The United States Supreme Court held some
years ago that unmarried women had the same rights of access to
contraceptives 6 and abortions as did married women.8 7 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, relying on statutory analysis rather than on a constitutional rule, allowed a concubine some, but not all, rights of a spouse
to worker's compensation benefits arising upon the death of a paramour.88 Presumably, this kind of statutory right to basic damages from
the injury of a person on whom one depended would be the kind of
public policy interest that would qualify, in an equal protection analysis,
for higher scrutiny.
The state, no doubt, also has an interest in protecting the rights of
third persons as against secret equities between spouses and the parties
to a cohabitation agreement. In those instances, allowing third persons
to depend on the public records or on acts of property acquisition,
listing only certain persons as owner, should prevail over the private
interests of the parties, whether married or not. Since the matrimonial
laws are so detailed with respect to the rights of spouses in this regard,
third persons purchasing immovables enjoy a certainty that would not
be present if unmarried couples were allowed the same rights as married
couples. In the latter case, some differing treatments and presumptions
may be justified. It is also in the state's interest to foster parental
support of children and to require that both parents be responsible for
that support. The requirement of marriage, along with the presumptions
of paternity of children born during the marriage, foster that policy.
Lack of such presumptions with illegitimate children may provide the
basis for regulations to make both parents of the illegitimate child
available for support.
Part of the difficulty in unifying the rules in these areas is the
simple fact that the legislation has never been systematized and the state
has not arranged its ostensible interests in fostering marriage in a coordinated way. The problem is not so much one of commission, but
rather one of neglect. For example, while the state has amended the
alimony laws to terminate payments upon cohabitation, the provisions

86.
87.
88.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978).
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which terminate a surviving spouse's usufruct apply upon remarriage,
8 9
though not upon cohabitation.
It is also ironic that in some areas the state discriminates against
the married couple and in favor of those living in concubinage. Louisiana
courts have upheld rulings of the State Racing Commission that withheld
a racing license from a wife on the grounds that her husband had been
suspended from racing horses because of misconduct. 90 Courts have also
upheld a rule that prevented spouses from racing their horses in the
same race even if they were under a separation of property agreement. 91
In both instances, the courts applied a low level of scrutiny and allowed
the discriminations to stand on the basis of preventing corruption in
horse racing. These cases pose serious due process problems. 92 Moreover,
they indicate that this is another area where legislative activity might
be fruitful, as when the legislature provided the impetus in the sex
discrimination cases.
EQUAL PROTECTION - TREATING THE STATE DIFFERENTLY

The Louisiana Supreme Court in 1982 found a denial of equal
protection in requirements that citizens suing state officials post substantial bonds, employing what was then described as middle level scrutiny. 93 It was predictable that the next attack would be on legislation
that prohibits jury trials in actions against governmental units.9 4 In April
of 1985, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Heindel v. HarleyDavidson Motorcycles 5 examined the matter and concluded that the
statutes were a denial of equal protection. In June, the supreme court
addressed the same issue in Rudolph v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.9"
and held that the statutes did not violate the equal protection guarantee.
The court of appeal, in Heindel concluded that a classification
touching on a right as substantial as a jury trial merits a higher level
of scrutiny than simple rationality and is to be judged by the middle

89. La. Civ. Code art. 890. See Benoit v. Benoit, 379 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979), reaffirming Succession of Viaud, 11 La. Ann. 297 (1856). La. Civ. Code art. 160,
unnumbered para. 3 (as amended by 1982 La. Acts No. 580): "This alimony shall be
revoked if ... the spouse to whom it has been awarded remarries or enters into open
concubinage."
90. Durham v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 458 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1984).
91. Fox v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 447 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
92. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984- Louisiana Constitutional Law,
45 La. L. Rev. 397 (1984).
93. Detraz v. Fontana, 416 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1982).
94. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 44 La.
L. Rev. 423, 428 (1983).
95. 467 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
96. 472 So. 2d 901 (La. 1985).
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level. The Louisiana court was clearly expanding the scope of this
fundamental rights branch of the equal protection analysis, unlike the
recent trend in the United States Supreme Court. 97 When the court
turned from a discussion of the level of scrutiny to be applied to the
facts and evidence in the case, it had little evidence on which to base
a decision. The record provided little evidence or testimony about the
actual or possible bases for the state treating itself differently from
private citizens in this regard. The court was left to speculate about
stopping the invasion of the state's deep pockets, "runaway juries,"
and "unfair verdicts." As was suggested earlier, the ultimate decision
was probably more one of basic philosophy than one based on empirical
data. 9
The supreme court in Rudolph, laboring in the absence of hard
data as to the purpose and effectiveness of the statute, also concentrated
on determining which level of scrutiny to apply. The court was on safe
grounds in finding that the right to a civil jury trial was not a fundamental one-(l) the federal seventh amendment has not been considered sufficiently important to be applied to the states;w (2) the state
constitution does not establish the right to a civil jury trial;' °° and (3)
the state's constitution provides for appellate review of facts found by
civil juries, which makes the role of the jury less important in this state
than in most.' 0 ' Applying the minimal rational basis test, the court,
without discussing whether the statutes did in fact preserve the state's
financial resources or in fact minimize delay and court costs, concluded
simply that the legislature "could have rationally believed' ' 10 2 that such
was the case and upheld the statute. Justice Lemmon dissented on the
equal-protection issue. 0
The immediate impact of Rudolph may not be far reaching, for it
involved a procedural statute that is not a substantial bar to suing or
collecting from the state or a governmental entity. Furthermore, appellate
review of facts is available to correct the errors made by the judge as
fact-finder. More important, though, is the indication of how the court
will handle legislation designed to provide lesser standards of conduct

97.

In the 1960's the supreme court was willing to impose the highest level of scrutiny

if a classification was based on a "suspect" classification (especially race) or affected a
"fundamental right" (especially voting). See Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 969 (10th ed. 1980).

98. Hargrave, supra note 94.
99. Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 943,
93 S.Ct. 290 (1972).
100. Carter v. City of New Orleans, 327 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
101. La. Const. art. V, §§ 5(C), 10(B).
102. 472 So. 2d at 905.
103. Id.
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for the state and its agencies than for private persons similarly situated,
and to otherwise limit recovery against governments. Under such statutes,
the invasion of the private interests will be greater, thus demanding
more explanation and a stronger rational basis from the state to support
the different classifications.
°4
The original opinion in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of LSU1
suggested there will be a relatively low level of equal protection scrutiny
in this area. In Sibley, the attack was on statutes limiting medical
malpractice liability to $500,000. The issue was not one of treating the
state differently, but rather of treating victims of medical malpractice
differently from victims of other tortfeasors. The emphasis was on
determining which level of scrutiny to apply rather than on weighing
the reasonableness of the classification. The court found no fundamental
right to sue in tort for unlimited amounts and no suspect classification;
thus, both reasons for heightened scrutiny were absent. The court dis05
tinguished Detraz v. Fontana'
on the grounds that the bond requirement
there was the result of the "unquestioned motive" to discourage suits
against the state demanding racial integration. Justice Lemmon dissented
on the equal protection issue; Justice Watson also dissented. Rehearing
was granted,1°6 and the case was remanded to the district court in light
of retroactive legislation allowing recovery in Sibley and limiting only
non-pecuniary damages to $500,000.07
The 1985 legislation adopted to control the state's expenditures to
satisfy tort judgments involves three primary approaches: (1) instead of
a lump sum award for "general and economic damage which may be
incurred subsequent to trial, the court may, in its discretion"' 0° order
a structured payment plan be awarded; 0 9 (2) "In any suit for personal
injury, the total amount recoverable, exclusive of medical care and related

104.

462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).

105.

416 So: 2d 1291 (La. 1982). Although the original opinion in Detraz is not clear,

it is true that the court spent some time in its opinion finding the anti-black motivation
in the legislation.
106. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of LSU, No. 84-C-0571 (September 18, 1985).
107. 1985 La. Acts No. 452 (amending La. R.S. 13:1506 and 5109(A)).
108. 1985 La. Acts No. 450 (adding La. R.S. 13:5114 (D) (Supp. 1986)).
109. 1985 La. Acts No. 450 (adding La. R.S. 13:5114(B)(1) (Supp. 1986)). A structured
payment plan is defined as:
A method by which the public entity held liable for damages, or the public
entity which agrees to compromise a cause of action for damages, is held
responsible. The plan may include immediate payments and the funding of an
investment, the principal and fruits of which are to be used to pay in future
years damages in accordance with the terms of the plan. Such plans may include,
but shall not be limited to, cash payments, annuities, trusts, reversionary medical
trusts, qualified assets as defined by Section 130 of the United States Internal
Revenue Code (26 USC §130), or any combination of them.
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benefits, and loss of.earnings and loss of future earnings, as provided
in this Section, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars;""' 0 and
(3) the abolition of strict liability for things other than buildings under
Civil Code article 2317 as to governmental entities so that they are not
liable unless they "had actual or constructive notice of the particular
vice or defect which caused the damage prior to the occurrence, and
a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect and has failed to
do so."'''
Structured Plans. Voluntary structured settlements are becoming more
common, but the innovation in the statute is the grant of power to a
judge to force such a structured plan on a plaintiff in some cases,
instead of awarding an immediate payment of money. The invasion of
the plaintiff's interest is relatively small. In theory at least, the lump
sum payment is discounted to present value, whereas the structured plan
will provide the same recovery in future dollars. Indeed, in a straight
due process analysis, it is arguable that the plaintiff is being deprived
of nothing, for he is being given his future losses as they occur.
In an equal protection analysis, the inquiry is why the plaintiff is
treated differently than other plaintiffs, and presumably only a minimal
rational basis need be shown. In addition to limiting .its present costs,
the state could also justify this approach by arguing that it is spreading
the risk of differing life expectancies among a large number of persons
and providing full recovery at less cost than with lump sum payments.
It can be argued that what is being withheld is the windfall payment
that would come to many litigants from damage awards that assume
average life expectancies and assume an inflation rate when the litigant
may not live so long or inflation will be less. This approach would also
arguably benefit those who will live longer by giving them more payments. If this statement is true one might inquire why the same rule is
not applied to all tort judgments or why is the rule not made mandatory,
instead of discretionary, with a judge? The current scheme does not
affect all plaintiffs suing the state; it only has an effect in those cases
in which the judge exercises discretion to order a structured settlement.
Not all successful plaintiffs against the state will be in the class in which
such plans are imposed; that is, the affected class is only going to be
a subgroup of all successful plaintiffs suing the state. It would seem
that saving costs while granting full losses would be a sufficiently rational
basis to support such a limited discrimination against a nonsuspect class.
Also, the state has greater stability and ability to pay over the long
term than the typical defendant.

110. 1985 La. Acts No. 452 (adding La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) (Supp. 1986)). Section
(B)(2) has a similar formula for wrongful death actions.
Ill. 1985 La. Acts No. 454 (adding La. R.S. 9:2800(B) (Supp. 1986)).
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The $500,000 Limitation. The cap of $500,000 is a limited one, for
the maximum applies only to those damages which are generally considered nonpecuniary, such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, disability, and presumably punitive damages.' 2 Payments for medical care
and related benefits and loss of earnings, both past and future, are still
unlimited. In wrongful death suits, loss of support, both past and future,
is also excluded from the limit." 3
A threshhold matter is the issue of standing. A statute such as this
is unlikely to be adjudicated as constitutional or not on its face;" 4 and
constitutionality will most likely be gauged under the facts of a particular
case. The plaintiff who challenges the statute will first have to prove
that the limitation prevents recovery of all of his nonpecuniary damages.
This will be difficult because in the first place, there will seldom be
such large awards, and secondly, it will be difficult to prove that mental
anguish and pain and suffering damages in such an amount were actually
suffered.
If standing is established, the due process argument will be a weak
one, for granting $500,000 in nonpecuniary damages is hardly a serious
invasion of one's interests. In an equal protection analysis, again without
a suspect class, the scrutiny will be minimal. The rational basis of
limiting the award to one person so that scarce funds available can be
spread out among a greater number of tort victims would seem to fit
here.
The Strict Liability Limits. The state's strict liability for damages

-

caused by its buildings remains unchanged. With respect to other things
which public entities "have in [their] custody,""' 5 the entities are liable
under a lesser standard. Liability is not "strict" but is founded on basic
negligence principles. Here, the individual plaintiff's interests are probably invaded more than in the other two statutes; there may well be
no recovery at all against the state under facts which would provide
recovery against a private person. But again, the analysis is probably
best made if one focuses on an individual plaintiff instead of discussing
the state's interests in the abstract. The statute itself will take care of
a large part of the problem, for it excludes "building" from the exceptions. Here, the state is treated the same as a private citizen.

112. It appears that the state will be treated just as any other defendant from whom
exemplary damages may be sought under La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.1 (hazardous substances)
and 2315.2 (intoxicated driver). The state could also be responsible for exemplary damages
if it is solidarily liable with a tortfeasor whose conduct falls under 2315.1 or 2315.2.
113. Note that the Sibley statute is similarly changed by .1985 La. Acts No. 239
(amending La. R.S. 40:1299.39(A)(7) and (H) and 40:1299.39(B) (Supp. 1986)).
114. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985).
115. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.
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Any other case will involve a specific "thing". The most likely
example is that of the public road. The justification for a different
treatment of the state, whose public road causes damage, and the private
landowner, whose private road causes damage, will rest on open versus
limited use. The key here is the type of property and the type of use,
rather than the simple fact that the state is the defendant. This is
consistent with the long tradition of distinguishing between the state's
public domain and its private domain and providing different rules for
each. It is also realistic since, for example, the state's control over its
roads is much less than over its buildings. For the access to the latter
is not as free as to the former. And, in the case of roads, the use by
the general public contributes to the condition causing a harm. Reinforcing this approach is the fact that legislation has already made distinctions among various types of uses of land in reducing liability for
some of those uses. The character of the use is crucial to those distinctions, not the status of the owner. La. R.S. 9:2795 is an example
of this approach-a landowner is not liable for damages, except for
willful or malicious failure to warn, to recreational users of his land
without charge. The definitions for purposes of this statute indicate that
land includes roads." 6 Similarly, section 2798 reduces the standard of
conduct of a landowner who allows his property to be used for a polling
place. Section 2796 also limits liability for losses connected with Mardi
Gras parades and festivities.
These examples support the conclusion that there is a rational basis
for a lesser standard as to certain types of property which pose a special
kind of risk, but not for other types of property where the risk present
to the state is the same risk present to any other private citizen. Under
this view, the issue is whether the type of use should be worthy of a
special, less stringent standard, because of extra risk or notions of
spreading the risk or for other reasons. Airport runways, bridges, and
prison yards, for example, fit well in the traditional category of public
things where there are unique access considerations and special risks.
On the other hand, stadiums, animals, and automobiles tend to put the
state at risk in the same way that private citizens are put at risk. It
may be more difficult to exonerate the state totally from liability in
these situations in which private citizens are not so treated.
EFFECTIVE DATE-DUE PROCESS

In State v. Miller,"7 the defendant argued that his second degree
murder conviction was improper because he was prosecuted under an

116.
117.

See Keelen v. State, 463 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1985).
448 So. 2d 137 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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amended statute which, though adopted, had not been published in the
state journal at the time the offense was committed. The amendment
was by its terms effective on the signature of the governor, June 29,
1979, but the act was not published until July 14. The crime occurred
on July 9.
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, relying on the text of
Louisiana Constitution article 3, section 19 which normally makes legislation effective only after publication but which also provides without
qualification that "any bill may specify an earlier or later effective
date." While the constitutional convention record discloses that in the
usual case publication is a prerequisite for effectiveness, it was clear
that an exception to that requirement is permitted when the bill provides
otherwise. 118
Other constitutional provisions, however, limit the power to specify
an effective date that is prior to enactment or publication. Article 1,
section 23 prohibits ex post facto laws-criminal laws punishing conduct

that was not prohibited at the time it occurred. The instant case may
not technically be a violation of that prohibition because the statute
had arguably been adopted at the time the crime was committed. However, it sould be considered whether the power to make laws effective
before they are reasonably able to be known by citizens is consistent
with the policies underlying article 1, section 23.119
Those policy concerns are helpful, also, in applying the due process
clause of article 1, section 2. As with the void for vagueness doctrine,
due process would prohibit deprivations of liberty by criminal statutes
adopted in such a way that a person does not have a reasonable means

of knowing what conduct was prohibited at the time he acted.120 In

118. 5 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, July 28, 1973 at 452 (hereinafter cited as Records].
119. See Reichenphader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 648 (La. 1982). See also State
v. Hicks, 377 So. 2d 86 (La. 1979). Though Hicks apparently was decided on statutory
grounds, the influence of ex post facto policy concerns appears as the court overturned
a conviction for possession of Talwin, the incident of possession occuring before the rule
of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Resources adding that drug
to the list of controlled dangerous substances was published in the Louisiana Register.
The rule had specified an earlier effective date.
120. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972); State
v. Dousay, 378 So. 2d 414 (La. 1979); Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980Louisiana Constitutional Law, 41 La. L. Rev. 529, 544 (1981). See also W. Slawson,
Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 Calif. L. Rev.
216, 221 (1960); C. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692 (1960); Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law
471 (2d Ed. West 1983). The court in Jones v. State, 336 So. 2d 59 (La. App. ist Cir.
1976), considered a due process argument but found adequate notice of the establishment
of time delays for qualifying for a new judgeship.
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Lambert v. California,2' the United States Supreme Court held that it
was a denial of due process to punish one for the crime of failing to
register with the police when a reasonable person would not know of
such a duty; in the same way, lack of publicity of some kind would
be a failure to give one notice. In State v. Brown, 21 the Louisiana
Supreme Court applied a similar analysis to make it unconstitutional to
convict one of unknowingly possessing a certain substance; an opportunity to know of the possession was essential. This approach, of course,
reflects long-standing general principles appearing in the state's earliest
civil codes about the need for promulgation because "laws cannot be
2 3
obligatory without being known."'
In Miller, the court did not pursue a due process analysis, for the
issue apparently was not raised. If it had been, the result would probably
be sustainable, for even if the new statute could not apply, the defendant's conduct was punishable under the old statutes.
The defendant in Miller was accused of killing a victim while committing a robbery. Though the facts are not clear; the conduct could
have been punishable either as an intentional homicide or under the
felony murder doctrine. Under the old law, the former would have been
first degree murder and the latter second degree murder. After the
amendment, both types of killings would qualify as second degree murder. 24 The decision did not result in a basic unfairness to the defendant
because the substantive standards were not changed, and his conduct
was punishable under either statute. But the difference that could have
resulted under the amendment related to the possible penalty. Under
both second degree murder statutes, the penalty was mandatory life
imprisonment. Under the earlier law, there could be parole after 40
years, but under the later law, there could be no parole at all. Under
first degree murder, the death penalty would have been a possibility.
In any case, the change produced a minimal invasion of the defendant's
interests.

If, however, the interest invaded is more serious, as with statutes
adopting new crimes, the due process problem will become more important. The argument could be made that as soon as a reasonable
citizen would know of the likelihood of the passage of a bill and the
likelihood of its being effective on the action of the governor, the
requirement of informing the citizen that his conduct is criminal is met.

121. 335 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240 (1957). Cf. U.S. v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct.
1112 (1971). See Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Criminal Law, 42 La.
L. Rev. 541 (1982).
122. 389 So. 2d 48 (La. 1980).
123. La. Civ. Code art. 4; La. Civ. Code art. 4, para. 1(1825); La. Digest of 1808
p. 2, art. 4, para. 1.
124. See La. R.S. 14:30, 30.1; 1978 La. Acts No. 769 and 1979 La. Acts No. 74.
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The analogy would be to federal tax cases125 which make changes effective
at a point in the legislative process when it becomes public knowledge
that the change is likely to occur. However, the analogy is weak. Even
if a citizen were aware of the bill, how many read the bill? How many
would have access to information about the effective date? Of course,
the standards for crimes are much higher in this regard than in tax

cases. 126
When the state is called on to justify such a serious intrusion on
individual interests, it would have to furnish a high level of justification
for making the law effective before it is made known to its citizens.
Perhaps true emergencies might qualify, as when natural disasters or
serious riots are causing substantial harms. But normal criminal statutes
and amendments to criminal statutes hardly meet those requirements.
Indeed, when there is room to construe these provisions, they ought
to be construed to make the exception of article 3, section 19 for
effectiveness before publication a narrow one. The author of the section
made it clear that the change making the effective date later than under
the prior constitution was so "that it will be readily accessible to the
public.' 127 Debate indicated that the exception "should take care of
emergency bills." 2 Of course, such an approach cannot vary the text
of section 19 itself, which does not confine the provision to emergencies.
But that emphasis on emergencies should be a legitimate consideration
in a due process analysis where there is flexibility in a traditional weighing
analysis. Such concerns certainly support the view that the state's interest
in making the statute effective before publication is not a strong one
absent a real emergency.
Indeed, these considerations go beyond a court's due process analysis.
The legislature is the threshold protector of constitutional values since
it can refuse to adopt legislation it considers unconstitutional. 2 9 It should
be exercising its restraint to limit the numbers of bills that are designated
to be effective before publication. There has been a tendency to increase
the numbers in this regard in recent years, one which the legislature
should be able to stop easily once it is aware of the pitfalls of its
approach.

125. S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1174 (1973). (The Constitution of the
United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation).
126. Nowak, supra note 120, at 474.
127. Records supra note 118, at 452. Delegate Jenkins proposed the language that was
adopted.
128. 9 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, November 18, 1973, at 2518 - Delegate Tate speaking during consideration of
style and drafting changes. There was concern about what effect a strike at the official
journal would present the effectiveness of legislation.
129. Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975).

